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FRAUD ON THE MARKET AFTER
AMGEN
JAMES D. COX

*

There are multiple ways investors decide to purchase or sell a
security. The classic perspective envisions the investor studiously
poring through complex financial information with the particular
1
information relied upon coming from a variety of sources. Such
classical investing, of course, does not require that the investors do
their own evaluation; they frequently rely on intermediaries such as
brokers, investment advisors, and even financial columnists. Such
information mediation is efficient for the classic investor and creates
the demand side of the burgeoning market for the financial
intermediaries. Good investment advice leads to the same favorable
effect as the better mousetrap: The world beats a path to that
advisor’s door. By whatever method the classic investor uses to be
informed, what motivates the classic investor is the belief that there
are opportunities for a reasonable return by the astute deciphering of
publicly available information.
A variation of the classic investor model is the professional trader
that has armed itself with a proprietary algorithm for detecting “buy”
2
and “sell” opportunities. The inputs to such a model vary greatly and
may not even include the security’s price, but likely focus on a range
of other performance data the investor believes predictive of
performance by the security. To be sure, the professional trader relies
on publicly available information but not always the same
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1. See, e.g., BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS passim (5th
ed. 1951) (describing processes to analyze financial statements and determine intrinsic value of
shares as prelude to identifying whether a security offers the prospect of a positive return).
2. The professional trader may be guided by a proprietary algorithm keyed to financial
information regarding the firm or various market developments. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New
Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 689–93 (2013) (describing the rising role of such traders in
capital markets).
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information as the classic investor. Thus, a kernel of information that
may well be dispositive to the classic investors may not be to the
3
professional trader and vice versa.
At the other extreme from either the classical investor or
professional trader is the proverbial dart thrower whose decision to
purchase or sell is guided not by analysis, but by the fortuity of the
4
dart’s path. Just why throw darts is an interesting question. Some may
counsel throwing darts as the natural response/unqualified obeisance
to the teachings of the efficient market hypothesis: Security prices
reflect all publicly available information so that it is not possible to
earn an above average return on the basis of public information.
Better to read a book than analyze dense financial information;
knowledge improves the mind, but pursuit of underpriced or
5
overpriced securities is not productive.
6
In addition, an ever-growing investment strategy is indexing.
Indexers seek to mimic the performance of a particular index, such as
the Standard & Poor’s Industrial 500. Indexers and dart throwers may
share a common position: It is not possible to beat the market.
Whereas the indexer is more systematic in how it responds to this
believed-reality of the market, the dart thrower is neutral on what the
proper weight should be for any single stock in her portfolio and
simply casts her fate to the winds. Indexers may have other reasons
not to invest classically. Some financial institutions are so large that it
would be extraordinarily burdensome, practically and financially, to
3. See, e.g., GAMCO Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi, S.A., 927 F. Supp. 2d 88, 101–02
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that even though the misrepresentation impacted the price of Vivendi
shares, the facts that were misrepresented did not assume importance in the professional
trader’s investment model).
4. See Georgette Jasen, Investment Dartboard: A Brief History of Our Contest, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 7, 1998, at C1 (recounting the extensive history—100 six-month contests—of pitting dart
throwers against selected analysts, where the dart throwers’ average gain of 4.5 percent fell
short of the 6.8 percent average gain of the Dow Industrials and the 10.9 percent average return
garnered by analysts).
5. For example, Brad M. Barber and Douglas Loeffler suggest that the greater return by
the analysts was due to their selecting riskier securities—adjusted for risk they earned only 4.06
percent greater than the dart throwers—and likely “piling on” by investors who learned of the
analysts’ recommendations before the six-month measurement period ended. Brad M. Barber &
Douglas Loeffler, The “Dartboard” Column: Second-Hand Information and Price Pressure, 28 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 273, 274 (1993).
6. For example, more than one-third of total mutual fund assets and exchange-traded
funds are passively managed. A Steady Climb for Indexing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2013, at R1.
These passively managed products have grown at an average annual rate of 26 percent over the
past seventeen years, twice that of actively managed mutual funds over the same period.
Rodney N. Sullivan & James X. Xiong, How Index Trading Increases Market Vulnerability, 68
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 70, 72–73 (2012).
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actively manage all or a substantial portion of their portfolio. The
costs of active management for all funds would reduce the returns for
their beneficiaries. Hence, limiting discretionary investing reduces
overall management costs and enables limited-time investment
7
decisions to be more focused. The pursuit of an indexing strategy,
therefore, can be driven by a quest for administrative efficiency and
not solely by the tenets of the efficient market hypothesis. Indexing is
also informed by portfolio theory. With portfolio theory, we find that
the power of an academic theory has cabined resources into clusters
where aggregate risk is the focus so that the concern is the individual
8
security’s impact on overall portfolio risk.
9
A final type of investing is style investing. The style investor
certainly would include indexing but is much broader and variable.
The pursued style can be the result of a perceived economic trend—
for example, a broadly-based preference of Internet-based companies
over pharmaceuticals—which can change after a few weeks or
months, so that later the perceived trend is, for example, extractive
10
industries over Internet-based companies. Style investing is in a
sense passive investing, but not in the same way as indexing. Style
investing entails some cognitive effort to identify the trends. There is
growing evidence of a “piling on” feature among many institutions,
i.e., style investing, where we observe that institutions alter their
investment portfolio so as to mimic the profitable pursuits of earlier
first-embracers of an economic sector that produced abnormal
7. See, e.g., Jason Kephart, Passive Investing: If Its Good Enough for CalPERS…,
INVESTMENT NEWS (Mar. 24, 2013, 4:29 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20130324/FREE/130329970# (discussing pension fund giant, CalPERS, which has passively
invested more than one-half of its $255 billion portfolio). See also Passive Equity Portfolios of 10
Large Pension Funds, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.pionline.com/
gallery/20130325/SLIDESHOW2/325009999 (noting that passive investment for the top five
pension funds’ equity portfolios was 74 to 93 percent).
8. This in turn can induce further passivity in oversight on the part of such institutional
holders. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
863 (2013) (noting that portfolio theory has contributed to passive investment practices by
institutional holders and thereby weakened the value of governance/monitoring rights, such as
voting, for which activist investors provide something of an efficient antidote).
9. See Nicholas Barberis & Andrei Shleifer, Style Investing, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 161, 164–66
(2003) (noting that it is not the prospective cash flows associated with the individual firm, but
rather the risk-return profile, and other like measures, of a group of firms).
10. For evidence of style investing, see Nicole Choi & Richard W. Sias, Institutional
Industry Herding, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 469, 480–82 (2009) (documenting evidence of style
investing); Kenneth Froot & Melvyn Teo, Style Investing and Institutional Industry Herding, 43
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 883, 904–05 (2008) (concluding that evidence of style
investing tactics was present in investor decisions).
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returns for the earlier investors.
In sum, there are a wide range of investment approaches in
today’s markets. Complementing the above description is that many
of the investors, not so with the dart thrower and less so for the style
investor, practice, to some extent, portfolio investing; with portfolio
investing, the merits of a particular stock are assessed, not by isolating
that stock’s perceived risk-return, but by assessing how the stock’s
acquisition or disposition will impact the overall risk-return of the
investor’s portfolio. For this calculation, the co-movement of the
individual security to the market, rather than its particular financial
performance and position, weighs heavily in the investor’s decision
making. Although the individual firm’s return over time is no doubt
impacted by the firm’s periodic release of financial information
regarding its performance, the portfolio investor’s engagement with
that information is attenuated, as the focus of portfolio investment is
the co-variance of an individual security’s performance over time.
Now assume that the classic investor, the professional trader, the
dart thrower, the indexer, and the style investor each purchased the
same security, only to learn that its price had been inflated by
accounting chicanery carried out by nefarious corporate officers. The
above-described constellation of investment approaches challenges
the contemporary heuristic—reliance—for handling causation when
fraudulent information reaches public securities markets and
investors collectively seek relief through a class action. To be sure, the
classic investor can be thought to rely on the fraudulent information,
albeit more likely indirectly. Whether the professional trader relied
will depend on whether the model used incorporated the particular
data, for example a security’s price, that was misrepresented or
affected by the misrepresentation. There appears to be no basis to
conclude that the dart thrower, indexer, or style investor relied on any
information whatsoever. But does the absence of classical reliance
mean there is also the absence of a claim, or at least one that can be
prosecuted collectively as a class action? Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
11
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds brings the Supreme Court closer
to resolving this question. As will be seen, Amgen houses the dog that
did not bark. Its most significant contribution is not the issue it did
resolve; instead, Amgen is the harbinger for the resolution of the most
significant development for future securities class action litigation—

11. 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
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the viability of the fraud on the market approach to causation.
I. RELIANCE TO FRAUD ON THE MARKET
Most securities fraud actions occur under the antifraud provision,
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act). Requiring reliance on the misrepresentation was
12
solidified in the antifraud jurisprudence in List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
where the Second Circuit reasoned that reliance was necessary “to
certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff’s
13
injury.” The court observed that if it did not require reliance it would
14
be eliminating “the principle of causation in fact.” After reviewing
the extensive trial record, the Second Circuit held that the district
court properly concluded that the plaintiffs would have sold their
15
shares regardless of whether they had known of the omitted facts.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have also demanded that causation,
frequently referred to as transaction causation, be established
16
between the misrepresentation and the investor’s decision, so that
12. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). There are of course much earlier references to reliance in
private litigation under the antifraud provision. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp.
808, 833 (D. Del. 1951) (allowing suit to proceed because all members of the class relied on the
defendant’s misrepresentations).
13. List, 340 F.2d at 462. In taking this position, the court liberally invoked the
Restatement of Torts as well as the leading treatises by Prosser and Harper. Id.
14. Id. at 463.
15. Id. at 464.
16. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972), the Court broadly
stated that “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose,
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts
withheld be material.” Taken literally, as many lower courts have, this makes positive proof of
reliance depend on whether the misrepresentation is a misstatement or omission. This ascribes
too little weight to the defendants’ egregious misconduct and sympathetic position of the
plaintiffs in Affiliated Ute. While representing very unsophisticated and obviously dependent
clients wishing to sell their privately held shares, the defendants failed to disclose that the
defendants not only had standing orders at prices several times what the defendants purchased
the shares from the plaintiffs, but also that the defendants thereby were garnering enormous
profits through their representation of the plaintiffs. Id. at 151–54, 161. Reliance could,
therefore, be easily presumed under these facts. Id. at 153–54. The Supreme Court has also been
pragmatic when dealing with transaction causation in the context of aggregate decision making.
Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co. is such a case. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). Mills involved a material
omission in a proxy statement seeking the approval of the shareholders of a public corporation.
Id. at 384. As a result of Mills, transaction causation does not require proof of how each
shareholder would have voted had the omission not occurred; rather, transaction causation is
established by evidence demonstrating that the defendant lacked sufficient votes to approve the
transaction under state law. Id. at 384–85. Thus, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501
U.S. 1083, 1107–08 (1991), causation was lacking because the defendant controlled sufficient
shares to assure approval of the transaction. However, if the omission prevents the individual
shareholder from exercising his appraisal remedy, causation is not impacted by the defendant’s
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transaction causation in some form is above peradventure in private
antifraud suits. But does such causation require proof the investors
relied?
For most investors who purchase publicly traded shares, initiating
an individual suit is not an option; the recoverable amount is too
17
slight to justify the suit’s costs. Thus, although the class action is not
the last resort, it is the only viable option for most aggrieved investors.
Yet, a single issue stands in the path of investors seeking to join their
claims: whether proof of individual reliance is required for recovery.
Because the burden of inquiring whether hundreds, or likely
thousands, of investors relied on the alleged misrepresentation would
be overwhelming, the suit could not be certified as a class if the courts
required each class member to establish his or her reliance on the
alleged misrepresentation.
Claims of fraud by numerous investors naturally invite the
question whether the alleged fraud was causally related to the harm
investors alleged. As seen, the courts have historically examined this
connection through the lens of reliance or, somewhat more generally,
transaction causation. How courts address causation, therefore,
necessarily implicates whether aggregation of claims is permissible.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s initial engagement of this question for
fraudulent releases of information in connection with publicly traded
companies, the lower courts pursued one of three distinct approaches:
Some courts held that reliance is satisfied due to the proximate
causation between the misstatement and harm; other courts held that
reliance requirements should be relaxed because to hold otherwise
would impose an overly burdensome evidentiary requirement; and,
most commonly, courts simply combined the two rationales.
18
Panzirer v. Wolf illustrates the first approach to justifying fraud
on the market. For simplicity, this approach will be referred to as the
price distortion justification. Zelda Panzirer, a substitute school
teacher, while traveling to Vermont with her husband, was attracted to
a story in the Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column that
unquestionable voting power to assure the transaction, because individual, not aggregate,
decision-making renders causation an inquiry into how the omission or misstatement impacted
the plaintiff’s resort to appraisal. Wilson v. Great Am. Ind., Inc., 979 F.2d 924, 931 (2d Cir.
1992).
17. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 815
(2013) (noting that numerous court decisions have found that where investors cannot rely on the
class action device to bring fraud suits, the alternative is not bringing a claim at all).
18. 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981).
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provided an optimistic report on companies that produced
19
educational cassettes. Two paragraphs of the story were devoted to a
20
favorable review of Allied Artists. She asked her husband to stop the
21
car so that she could call her broker. After reviewing the Standard &
Poor’s Tear Sheets for a few minutes, the broker reassured her that
22
there appeared to be no negative news regarding Allied. Thereupon
she purchased 200 Allied shares; later that day she acquired another
23
500 shares. A few months later, Allied filed for bankruptcy, at which
time it was discovered that the annual report relied on by Standard &
Poor’s inflated Allied’s revenues and the auditor failed to qualify its
24
opinion regarding Allied’s ability to continue as a going concern. In
certifying the class, the Second Circuit described in great detail a
prima facie acceptable causal chain:
[T]he plaintiff argues that if Allied’s report had been accurate, the
stock analysts interviewed by the Journal would not have
mentioned the company favorably, the Journal would not have
devoted two paragraphs to Allied’s prospects in the video cassette
market, and plaintiff would not have been led by the article to buy
her stock. Defendants have introduced no evidence to contradict
this chain of causation. Though, at trial, the validity of the chain of
causation will be tested, on summary judgment questions about
this chain of causation must be resolved in favor of plaintiff, who in
the case of a material fraud on the market enjoys a presumption of
reliance. Where the plaintiff acts upon information from those
working in or reporting on the securities markets, and where that
information is circulated after a material misrepresentation or
omission, plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim of reliance on the
25
misrepresentation or omission.

19. Id. at 367.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. Similar reasoning appears in Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)
(“Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not
directly rely on the misstatements. The misstatements may affect the price of the stock, and thus
defraud purchasers who rely on the price as an indication of the stock’s value.”). See also
Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 69 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that
misrepresentation causes harm to the investor “either directly (through actual reliance) or
indirectly (by affecting the market upon which the party traded)” (citation omitted)).
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In contrast to the price distortion approach, some early courts
presumed reliance in part out of evidentiary concerns, fearing an
inquiry into reliance would not likely be productive while proving an
unmanageable burden for the litigants and the court. For example, as
one district court found:
[W]hile some sort of reliance on the part of the plaintiff still must
be proved, it appears that reliance of the actual, subjective,
individual nature necessary in the classical fraud case would
unnecessarily encumber large 10b-5 actions and thereby thwart the
Congressional interest in providing a means by which investors
may recover against market manipulators in federal court. In the
stock exchange context (as opposed to closely held stock sold and
purchased in a face-to-face transaction) the interest of Congress in
seeing that the integrity of the market is preserved is even
26
greater.

More frequently, both justifications were invoked by the lower
courts, as illustrated by the “seminal and best known of the ‘fraud on
27
28
the market’ cases” —Blackie v. Barrack :
Here, we eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs prove reliance
directly in this context because the requirement imposes an
unreasonable and irrelevant evidentiary burden. A purchaser on
the stock exchanges may be either unaware of a specific false
representation, or may not directly rely on it; he may purchase
because of a favorable price trend, price earnings ratio, or some
other factor. Nevertheless, he relies generally on the supposition
that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected
manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly
on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price
whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material
misrepresentations. Requiring direct proof from each purchaser
that he relied on a particular representation when purchasing
would defeat recovery by those whose reliance was indirect,
despite the fact that the causational chain is broken only if the
purchaser would have purchased the stock even had he known of

26. In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Cf. Chris-Craft Ind., Inc.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a bidder whose tender
offer was allegedly thwarted by another’s misrepresentations was excused of proving individual
reliance on the misrepresentations by the target shareholders because such an undertaking
would be so burdensome as to be impractical).
27. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 478 (5th Cir. 1981).
28. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
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29

the misrepresentation.

Fraud on the market ultimately reached the Supreme Court in
30
Basic Inc. v. Levinson. On three occasions over a thirteen-month
period, Basic stated that it was not aware of any company
development that would explain the increased trading in its stock,
even though it was engaged in discussions and negotiations for its
31
acquisition with Combustion. When Basic ultimately announced it
would merge with Combustion Engineering, its stock soared.
Disappointed investors who sold Basic shares in the interval between
its first denial and the merger’s announcement brought a class action
alleging the misstatements were materially misleading. Their suit
would ultimately establish the parameters within which the securities
class action suit survives, if only barely at times.
32
With only six Justices participating, a majority held it was
sufficient that class members alleged they had relied on their belief
33
that the security’s price reflected all publicly available information.
The Court’s slim majority reasoned “that persons who had traded
Basic shares had done so in reliance on the integrity of the price set
34
by the market.” Note here the reliance to be presumed is not on any
particular information that may have impacted a security’s price, but
rather that the price of the security is impacted by financially
significant information. Thus, Basic did not adopt an approach that
required evidence only that the defendant’s misrepresentation
impacted the stock’s price and, thus, caused the class members to
purchase or sell at a price distorted by the misrepresentation. By
retaining reliance, Basic required more. As will be seen, it is on this
point that the mischief and difficulty in applying Basic becomes
problematic. The Court spoke broadly about how prices are formed in
well-developed markets:

29. Id. at 907. See also Shores, 647 F.2d at 479 (Randall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for “partial abandonment of the reliance requirement”); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 480–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (discussing the market response to a corporation’s
misstatements and subsequent investor reliance on the market price).
30. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
31. Id. at 227–28.
32. In Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 n.1 (2013),
Justice Ginsburg expressly observed in her opinion for the majority that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1, a majority of a quorum of six Justices constitutes a majority opinion of the Court.
33. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 245. The Court also held that the materiality of speculative
information should be the product of the probability of the event’s occurrence and the event’s
magnitude. Id. at 231–33.
34. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).

COX 2.4.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

10

2/15/2014 2:45 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 9

The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in
an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s
stock is determined by the available material information
regarding the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements
will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers
do not directly rely on the misstatements. . . . The causal connection
between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock
in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance
35
on misrepresentations.

Justice Blackmun further supported the plurality opinion by
contrasting the different decision-making found in the personal faceto-face transaction and impersonal market transaction:
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into the investor’s reliance
upon information is into the subjective pricing of that information
by the investor. With the presence of a market, the market is
interposed between the seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits
information to the investor in the processed form of a market
price. Thus the market is performing a substantial part of the
valuation process performed by the investor in a face-to-face
transaction. The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the
investor, informing him that given all the information available to
36
it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.

Note that the Basic majority stopped short of saying evidence of
such a connection satisfied causality, even for the purpose of
certifying the class. Importantly, the Basic majority observed that the
presumption of reliance in the first instance was supported, like
presumptions generally, on “fairness, public policy, and probability, as
37
well as judicial economy.” To this end, the Basic majority reasoned
35. Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)). The
reasoning adopted in Basic was more fully developed earlier in a leading fraud on the market
case, Blackie. In Blackie, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the investor “relies generally on the
supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has
artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representation underlying
the stock price whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material
misrepresentations.” Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975). The court further
supported its position by concluding that the approach was consistent with the purpose of the
antifraud statute: to “foster an expectation that securities markets are free from fraud an
expectation on which purchasers should be able to rely.” Id. See also Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161 (“In
an open and developed market, the dissemination of material misrepresentations or withholding
of material information typically affects the price of the stock, and purchasers generally rely on
the price of the stock as a reflection of its value.”). The Basic Court also believed that fraud on
the market was consistent with Congress’s intent. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 245–46.
36. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D.
Tex. 1980)).
37. Id. at 245.
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that presuming reliance was consistent with the broad congressional
objective of facilitating investor reliance on the “integrity” of
securities markets and further supported its conclusion on how stock
38
prices are formed in well-developed markets. As further support for
presuming investor reliance, the Basic majority invoked the
contemporary empirical evidence of stock-price formation and the
related commentary on the implications of that literature for the
39
conduct of securities class actions. Thus, reliance was initially
presumed on public policy considerations and then further supported
by the majority’s understanding of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH), the latter of which remains part of the case for the securities
class action plaintiff. But Basic is opaque on just what it is that
investors are presumed to rely on in such a well-developed market.
The Basic majority was clearly influenced by what it believed
were the insights to be drawn from the EMH, citing at one point to
40
works summarizing the tenets of the EMH. Broadly stated, the
EMH holds that publicly available information is rapidly
incorporated in the price of publicly traded securities. It is safe to say
that whatever the views of the EMH were when Basic was decided
41
twenty-five years ago, today those views are substantially qualified.
In light that much ink has been spilled since Basic was decided on the
relative efficiency of capital markets and, particularly, the descriptive
qualities of the EMH, it could be argued that Basic requires
reassessment in light of the growing body of knowledge regarding the
42
efficiency of markets.

38. Id. at 246.
39. Id. at 247 n.24 (citing to authorities reviewing studies bearing on the Efficient Market
Hypothesis).
40. Id.
41. Criticisms challenging the tenets of the EMH abound. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise,
41 J. FIN. 529, 532 (1986) (arguing that “[t]he increase in the amount of information trading does
not mean that prices are more efficient”); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market
Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591, 592 (1986) (“Thus the results [in this
article] call into question the theoretical as well as empirical underpinnings of the Efficient
Market Hypothesis.”). Joining the academics is one who has toiled long and well in the markets,
George Soros. In George Soros, Letters to the Editor: My Market Theory? Forget Theories,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at A33, Soros finds that the theory regarding market efficiency
distorts reality. Simply stated, neither investors nor markets perform in the way suggested by
the EMH.
42. Indeed, recently the Court agreed to reconsider fraud on the market. See Halliburton
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (granting certiorari to consider, among
other things, whether the Court should overrule or modify the holding of Basic insofar as it
recognizes the fraud on the market theory of reliance); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i,
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. Sept. 9, 2013).
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Yet, a broad reassessment appears unnecessary given that the
overarching tenet of Basic, reaffirmed in Amgen, is irrefutable: Stock
prices in markets generally respond to public information that is
financially significant. Instead, the true weakness in Basic is not its
reliance on a then-developing body of work focused on how securities
prices are formed, but that the majority extrapolated from that body
of work a very different insight than the one set forth in the
hypothesis; the majority used the EMH to prescribe how investors
interact with securities markets. Simply stated, the weakness of Basic
is that it drew conclusions from the EMH that are not within the
prescriptive tenets of the hypothesis itself, regardless of the
descriptive validity of the hypothesis. The majority erroneously
invoked the EMH as a description of investor behavior, rather than
the functioning of markets. An unvarnished application of the EMH,
however, or some variant of its teachings, would be premising fraud
on the market solely on price distortion, as did many pre-Basic
decisions.
Basic did not abandon reliance, but presumed its presence by
concluding that investors rely “on the integrity of the price set” in
43
“well-developed markets.” Because the EMH says nothing about
what investors in fact do, the link between the EMH and how
investors act is problematic. And, putting aside the EMH, there is
little to suggest that investors are so naïve as to believe that materially
misleading information never, or even seldom, enters into the pricing
of a security. Fraudulent reporting, even though not epidemic, does
occur, and with enough frequency to cause less than unquestioning
44
faith in financial reporting. And, because financial reporting can
involve material misrepresentations that occur without culpable
misbehavior, ex ante assumptions about misleading financial
information must account for misreporting that is the product of
culpable misconduct, as well as for misreporting that is not, which
presumably is more prevalent than fraudulent misreporting. Simply
put, material misrepresentations are a natural feature of the inherent
imperfections that surround financial reporting such that this is a
feature of assessing investment risk. Any belief that investors conform
43. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 246–47.
44. See Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to
Reliance and Third-Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2140 (2010)
(“Fraud distorts prices with some frequency, and no reasonable investor would ever assume
otherwise by relying blindly on price integrity. Efficient markets price the risk of asymmetric
information; they do not assume its absence.”).
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their behavior to the tenets of the EMH—that there is no potential
for future price movement based on publicly available information—
must confront the reality that investors actively pursue gains based on
publicly available information, a course of action directly at odds with
the EMH. Clearly, regardless of the overall predictive quality of the
EMH with respect to markets, the EMH is not a predictor of investor
behavior. As such, it is a very slender reed on which to premise a
presumption of how investors behave.
Regardless of weaknesses in Basic or the teachings of the EMH,
lower courts have overreacted to Basic’s holding. They did so by
restricting fraud on the market to individual securities they believed
45
were traded efficiently and by imposing a demanding requirement,
46
among other conditions, that market efficiency requires evidence
that a firm’s security reflected all publicly available information in
47
order for causation to be derived via fraud on the market. As a
45. See, e.g., Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 307, 315–16 (5th Cir. 2005)
(denying class certification due to low turnover of NASDAQ traded shares being inconsistent
with their being traded in an efficient market); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322, 325
(5th Cir. 2005) (denying class certification because shares of small-cap firm traded in OTCBB
were believed not to be traded efficiently).
46. The leading case for such factors is Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87
(D.N.J. 1989). See also Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the
Cammer factors). For a close analysis of the criteria used by the courts, see generally William O.
Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help us do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY
L.J. 843 (2005).
47. See, e.g., In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2005) (requiring
evidence that a security’s price responded rapidly to financially significant information); Gariety
v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 367–68 (4th Cir. 2004) (“A reasonable investor will rely
on the integrity of the market price, however, only if the market is efficient, because in an
efficient market, ‘the market price has integrity[;] . . . it adjusts rapidly to reflect all new
information.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good
Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
1059, 1060 (1990))); Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., 364 F.3d 657, 661 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n an
efficient market, it is assumed that all public information concerning a company is known to the
market and reflected in the market price of the company’s stock.”); No. 84 Employer-Teamster
Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 947 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“[I]n a modern and efficient securities market, the market price of a stock incorporates all
available public information.” (citation omitted)); GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272
F.3d 189, 208 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[S]tock prices reflect all available relevant information about the
stock’s economic value [in an efficient marketplace].”); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1163 n.2
(10th Cir. 2000) (finding that in an efficient market “the investor must rely on the market to
perform a valuation process which incorporates all publicly available information, including
misinformation” (citation omitted)); Kowal v. MCI Comm’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[I]n an efficient securities market all publicly available information regarding
a company’s prospects has been reflected in its shares’ price.” (citation omitted)); Freeman v.
Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 197 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The fraud on the market theory rests
on the assumption that the price of an actively traded security in an open, well-developed and
efficient market reflects all available information about the value of a company.” (citing Peil v.
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consequence, the conduct of securities fraud litigation occurs in a
world with binary markets: those with efficiently-traded securities and
those with inefficiently-traded securities. This is a condition most
48
believe does not exist.
Courts have therefore engaged in the quest to identify stocks
believed to trade in an efficient market. In doing so, they customarily
refer to the Cammer factors in determining whether to certify a class
49
based on fraud on the market. Cammer v. Bloom identified the
following factors to be considered in determining whether the subject
stock traded in an efficient market: 1) percentage of shares traded
weekly, 2) number of analysts following the issuer, 3) presence of
market makers and arbitrageurs, 4) eligibility to enter the SEC’s
integrated disclosure procedures, and 5) responsiveness of the
50
security’s price to new information. The most important factor is the
cause and effect relationship between a company’s disclosures and the
51
resulting change in the price of its shares. The Fifth Circuit has
observed that the last factor “goes to the heart of the ‘fraud on the
52
market’ theory.” The Fifth Circuit’s observation may be a
masterpiece of understatement: If there is proof of such a relationship
between information and stock price movement, why should the other
Cammer factors matter?
The post-Basic approach to fraud on the market has few, if any,
53
supporters. In addition to its most striking flaw, asserting that the
EMH is itself prescriptive of probable investor behavior, it also uses
Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)).
48. See supra note 41.
49. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
50. Id. at 1286–87.
51. Id. at 1291.
52. Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2005).
53. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 899 (2013) (arguing that “the natural outgrowth of the Court’s marketbased approach to securities fraud justifies resolving the tension in Amgen by overruling that
aspect of the Basic decision which retains a reliance requirement”); Donald C. Langevoort,
Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 154 (2009) (“Given the
majority’s instinct that plaintiffs should be entitled to rely on the integrity of the market price as
undistorted by fraud, the tool turned out to be both unnecessary and dangerous.” (emphasis
added)); see also Fisher, supra note 46, at 847 (arguing that during the Internet, high-tech, and
telecommunications bubble from 1998 to 2001, “courts [did] not produce justice when they
appl[ied] the efficient market, through event studies, to 10b-5 cases arising out of the bubble”);
Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991) (“[T]he focus of the
Supreme Court’s holding in Basic is misplaced: what determines whether investors were
justified in relying on the integrity of the market price is not the efficiency of the relevant
market but rather whether a misstatement distorted the price of the affected security.”).
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the EMH to draw the conclusion that investors rely on information
through their presumed reliance on security prices. Thus, for an
investor that does not rely on price, such as an indexer, style investor,
or one guided by portfolio theory, fraud on the market would not be
available. For this group, price, and hence price distortion, is not
believed causally important to their decisions so they are outside
Basic’s approach to fraud on the market. These conclusions lack
substantive support.
Consider that there is a wealth of evidence that investors have
54
heterogeneous expectations. Thus, in their response to public
information, investors can be expected to hold different views on the
significance of the information. In part, this is because they are
cognitively bound; their individual endowments will bias their
interpretation and reaction to the information, particularly to
financial information for which there is always inherent uncertainty as
55
to its impact on the future. Because there is no reason to suspect that
such cognition biases point in one direction, they may well not bias
stock prices, but they can produce a good deal of noise around what
56
might be thought to be the likely equilibrium price. Yet, security
prices are noisy and the assumption should be that investors, on
average, trade with a healthy understanding of the noise that
surrounds security prices and the sometimes-unreliable nature of
information that impacts security prices.
Compounding this problem, lower courts limit fraud on the
market to securities that meet certain conditions they believe qualify
a market as efficient. As seen, there is nothing in the EMH that
describes what investors in fact do. More specifically, there is nothing
in the EMH holding that investors react differently in trading publicly
traded stocks that are within the Cammer factors than how they react
when trading in publicly traded shares of stocks in smaller
capitalization issuers that do not meet all the Cammer factors.
54. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Competitive Price
Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 246, 252 (1976) (finding that, because investors have such different
levels of understanding of likely significance of information, it is not reasonable to expect a
security’s price to transfer information from informed to less informed investors).
55. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction
to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003) (reviewing why the EMH is likely qualified by
investors’ heterogeneous expectations, their cognitive biases, and practical limits on arbitrage).
56. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 738 (2003) (arguing that
in order to disturb share prices the cognitive biases must be both pervasive and correlated, and
arbitrage mechanisms must fail).
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Furthermore, since so much of the fraud on the market litmus test
turns on evidence suggesting stock prices will respond quickly to
releases of public information, why should not the focus be on the
stock’s price response to information of the same import that is the
subject of the suit? That is, if incorporation of information into a
security’s price is the standard for fraud on the market, then why is it
not relevant to testing that condition to examine how the security’s
price has responded to information believed analogous to the
allegedly fraudulent information? To the extent Basic rests on
assumptions about investors, should it not be open for discussion
whether investors likely believed that information of a certain type
would, for that security, impact the security’s price?
II. ENTER AMGEN
The above-described faults with Basic and its progeny provide
important background for understanding the true significance of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision, Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds. In Amgen, the class was composed
of investors who purchased Amgen shares during a period in which
Amgen allegedly made several material misrepresentations by failing
to disclose adverse information about two of its major pharmaceutical
57
products, Epogen and Aranesp. The issues before the Court were
whether, as a condition of certification of the class, the plaintiffs
should be required to establish the materiality of the alleged
misrepresentations and if the defendant should be accorded the
opportunity to rebut the assertion of materiality by showing that the
truth behind each of the alleged misrepresentations had already
58
entered the marketplace. Defendants predictably wished these issues
to be part of the class certification decision so as to reduce the
hydraulic pressure that class certification places on settlement even
59
when these issues are unresolved. Correlatively, the plaintiffs
57. A full narrative of the facts appears in Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds v. Amgen
Inc., 660 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2011). See id. at 1173 (“[A]lleged misstatements and omissions,
according to the complaint, inflated the price of Amgen’s stock when Connecticut Retirement
purchased it. Later, corrective disclosures allegedly caused Amgen’s stock price to fall, injuring
Connecticut Retirement.”).
58. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013)
(“The issue presented concerns the requirement stated in Rule 23(b)(3) that ‘the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.’”).
59. Id. (“According to Amgen, certification must be denied unless Connecticut
Retirement proves materiality, for immaterial misrepresentations or omissions, by definition,
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naturally preferred fewer substantive determinations in the all-critical
class certification stage.
Amgen’s significance is not how it resolved these opposing tugs.
As examined more closely below, four Justices joined Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion holding that a factually-based finding that a
material misrepresentation occurred is not a precondition to class
60
certification. The Amgen majority reasoned that, because issues to
be resolved for certification of the class are whether common
questions of law and fact predominate, it is not necessary to resolve
61
whether materiality exists.
For the majority, conditioning
certification on the plaintiffs’ proving materiality of the alleged
misrepresentation would amount to “put[ting] the cart before the
62
horse”; if at trial it should be determined the alleged omissions were
not material, this would be a conclusion binding on all class members.
Justice Alito concurred, but did so by expressing his interest in
revisiting the substantive theory on which common questions in
securities fraud claims depend—the fraud on the market presumption
63
of market causation. Less cautious were the dissenters, who not only
believed that proof of materiality was the sine qua non for class
certification, but openly expressed disapproval of the fraud on the
64
market theory. Thus, we find in Amgen the dog that would not
bark—the continuing vitality of the securities class action, though four
Justices are eager to revisit Basic.
65
The majority opinion in Amgen repeatedly references “efficient”
66
and “efficiency” when describing the instances in which the fraud on
the market approach to causation would be allowed. These
expressions were used to describe the natural incorporation of

would have no impact on Amgen’s stock price in an efficient market.”).
60. Id. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined the
majority opinion.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Though limiting his dissent to whether the
majority followed “Basic’s dictates,” Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Kennedy and Scalia,
observes, “[t]he Basic decision itself is questionable,” referring to the only four Justices then
approving fraud on the market and pointing toward the Amgen majority’s misgivings regarding
whether market efficiency is, as Basic has been interpreted, to be a binary—yes or no—
question, or whether it “operates differently depending on the information at issue.” Id. Justice
Scalia separately dissented but joined the part of Justice Thomas’s dissent inviting
reconsideration of Basic. Id. at 1206.
65. See, e.g., id. at 1190, 1193 (majority opinion).
66. See, e.g., id. at 1190, 1192.
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financially significant information into security prices. The
significance of Amgen is that it moves from this observation to
conclude that most investors “rely on the security’s market price as an
unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light of all public
68
information.” Missing in Amgen is the emphasis present in Basic that
69
the critical reliance is that of investors on the market; we can
therefore find in Amgen a subtle shift from the view that some
markets have characteristics that attract investors’ reliance on
security prices to a broader view where the focus is on the pricing
process and investor reliance on that process and not the market as
such. Moreover, Amgen does not require, as a condition of such
efficiency, evidence that the security historically reflected all material
70
public information. This moves the discourse away from the view
that pricing is binary, where for some securities the stock’s price
responds to financial information and for other securities there is
believed to be no such response.
Amgen moves to the defensible position that stock prices for
individual securities respond differently depending on the nature of
71
the information. For a stock to be within the reach of fraud on the
market, this need not always be the case—but generally. That is, the
majority expressly recognized that a security could be deemed traded
in an efficient market if its shares “generally” reflected publicly
72
available information. Amgen offers the following explanation of
how the fraud on the market presumption is justified:
This presumption springs from the very concept of market
efficiency. If a market is generally efficient in incorporating
publicly available information into a security’s market price . . . it is
reasonable to presume that most investors—knowing that they
have little hope of outperforming the market in the long run based
solely on their analysis of publicly available information—will rely
on the security’s market price as an unbiased assessment of the
security’s value in light of all public information. Thus, courts may
presume that investors trading in efficient markets indirectly rely
67. Id. at 1192.
68. Id.
69. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“An investor who buys or sells
stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.”).
70. See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1192 (“If a market is generally efficient in incorporating
publicly available information into a security’s market price, it is reasonable to presume that a
particular, public, material misrepresentation will be reflected in the security’s price.”).
71. Id. at 1197 n.6.
72. Id. at 1192.
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on public, material misrepresentations through their “reliance on
73
the integrity of the price set by the market.”

On the other hand, Amgen does not expressly reject reliance.
Thus, the Basic mystery continues. Namely, what showing beyond loss
74
causation —the linkage of the misrepresentation to an actual
economic loss by the investor—is required to invoke fraud on the
market? The opinion suggests that the Amgen majority’s
understanding of what constitutes an efficient market is a market that
75
regularly reflects publicly available information. At a minimum,
Amgen’s more relaxed view would appear to reject the lengthy list of
criteria that lower courts have developed as the gateway for class
certification based on fraud on the market, and it certainly rejects the
rigid litmus test that fraud on the market is available only for
securities whose trade demonstrates that all material information is
76
rapidly reflected in the security’s price. This observation invites
lower courts to consider what weight to give in those isolated
instances in which a security’s price does not respond to financially
significant information: Is the absence of observable price movement
evidence that the market is inefficient or that an efficient market is
documenting that the information was not financially significant? In
all respects, Amgen can be seen as moving the framework of fraud on
the market closer to what is supported by the efficient market
hypothesis literature. Simply stated, Amgen invites the testing of
market efficiency by its tasting—namely evidence of how a particular
security’s price has responded to financial announcements.

73. Id. at 1192–93 (emphasis added) (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 245). Central to Amgen’s
holding is Amgen’s concession that the alleged misrepresentations were public and that its
securities traded in an efficient market so that “the market for Amgen’s securities promptly
digested current information regarding Amgen from all publicly available sources and reflected
such information in Amgen’s stock price.” Id. at 1193.
74. Professor Donald Langevoort reports that at least Justice Brennan, part of the thin
plurality opinion in Basic, preferred a more permissive approach to causation, in which proof
that the misrepresentation distorted the security’s price would establish causation without
inquiry into any form of investor reliance. Langevoort, supra note 53, at 157 n.25. Amgen would
appear not to change the result in GAMCO Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi, S.A., 917 F. Supp. 2d 246,
262 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because there was a
question of fact as to whether the security’s price, even though distorted by fraudulent
statements, assumed any importance in the investment model used by the plaintiff investor).
75. See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1192 (noting that in an efficient market, all publicly available
information is generally incorporated into a security’s price).
76. See supra note 35.
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77

Earlier, in Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton, the Court rejected
the Fifth Circuit’s class certification requirement of establishing
78
factual allegations that support the claims of loss causation. As in
Amgen, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous court,
reasoned that requiring proof of loss causation as a condition to
certify the class “contravenes Basic’s fundamental premise—that an
investor presumptively relies on a misrepresentation so long as it was
79
reflected in the market price at the time of his transaction.”
However, one can appreciate that following Dura Pharmaceuticals,
80
Inc. v. Broudo, plaintiffs must allege that the misrepresentation
caused an economic loss; in fraud on the market cases this is
customarily satisfied with a factual allegation that the security’s price
changed in connection with the release of corrective or truthful
81
information. It thus appears that what the defendants sought in both
Amgen and Halliburton was an opportunity to challenge forensically
the factual allegations that the material omissions impacted the
security’s price. In Amgen, because the defendant had conceded its
stock traded in an efficient market and that the challenged statements
82
were public, there was little else the defense could raise to prevent
class certification. Halliburton raised the need to prove loss causation
at the class certification stage, before making its motion to dismiss—
the customary method of challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
83
allegations. Presumably, it chose to do so believing that a favorable
resolution was more likely at a hearing of the type customarily held to
render findings relevant to certifying the class, compared with the
more sterile, removed process of a motion to dismiss. So viewed, we
might consider that Halliburton’s impact on the defendant’s arsenal
and the plaintiff’s victory is merely shifting to a different point in the
litigation the need to set forth specific allegations of loss. That is, price
movement is not taken off the litigation or settlement table; price
movement remains a demanding and frequently mortal requirement

77. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
78. Id. at 2187 (holding that the Fifth Circuit erred in requiring evidence of loss causation
as a condition to certifying the class). The Supreme Court, applying similar reasoning to that of
Amgen, stressed that loss causation did not implicate commonality as does reliance, and thus
that inquiry into loss causation was not germane to class certification. Id. at 2186.
79. Id.
80. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
81. See, e.g., Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir.
2008) (dismissing for failure to plead facts establishing loss causation).
82. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2013).
83. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2185.
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of the plaintiff’s case that can be tested as early as a motion to dismiss.
Securities class action plaintiffs would have suffered a serious loss
had Amgen been decided differently and the burden placed on the
class to support a finding that Amgen’s stock price changed in
connection with the alleged nondisclosures. As seen earlier, Amgen
84
was a nondisclosure case. Had the plaintiff in such a case been
required, as a condition to class certification, to prove stock price
reaction to the alleged misrepresentations, it would likely have been
unable to comply. This is because a material nondisclosure frequently
affirms the status quo and thus is not “new” information in the hands
of investors. Price change would be all the more difficult to isolate
where, as was the case in Amgen, the effect of the nondisclosure is to
confirm investor expectations. In this case, the information that is
released would not be accompanied by any detectable market
response because it merely repeats what was expected. A
nondisclosure in a public market is existential: it leaves no imprint on
the path of a stock’s price. Thus, class actions premised on
nondisclosure would most certainly have been relics had Amgen been
differently decided. To be sure, upon disclosure of the omitted facts, a
market correction would not only bear on the impact of the omitted
fact, but also serve to confirm the materiality of that earlier omitted
85
fact. However, as Halliburton reasoned, the defendants may be able
to argue successfully that the price change that is then observed is
unrelated to the facts allegedly omitted earlier. Amgen, by holding
that the focus of the class certification inquiry is whether common
questions predominate places more weight on the pretrial motion to
dismiss.
Price movements of a security can thus assist the overall causation
inquiry. Both Amgen and Halliburton exclude this information from
the class certification stage. It should not be overlooked that a key
step toward resolving causation, and indeed the appropriateness of
class certification, is determining whether the alleged material
omission was committed, and if so whether it impacted the security’s
price so that it affected all class members. Price movement in
connection with the misrepresentation, or even disclosure of the truth,
is also relevant to whether the subject security is traded in an efficient
market so that fraud on the market is available. It is likely more

84. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
85. See Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2186.
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efficient with respect to judicial resources to simply reorient the focus
to the pre-Basic approaches discussed earlier—particularly, the
86
emphasis on price distortion being the lynch pin for causation. But if
that is not to occur, it remains consistent with Basic, Halliburton, and
Amgen to examine whether, for the individual security, there is a
record of price sensitivity to information of the order of the alleged
misrepresentation, which would suggest investors likely relied on the
security’s price to reflect such information. At the same time, the
absence of price movement in a nondisclosure case, such as in Amgen
or even in a misstatement case such as Basic, does not equate to
inefficiency. Information that is not new to the market cannot be
expected to move a security’s price. Thus, claims premised on a failure
to disclose are essentially alleging it was a violation to perpetuate the
status quo. Similarly, announcements confirming developments for
which investors had no doubts is not new information at all. In neither
case would we expect to see a price change. Thus, materiality must be
resolved on the merits; however, the matter of class certification
under Basic raises a different question that can be resolved without
examining only the market’s response to the particular
misrepresentation.
III. THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE
As seen, Amgen and Halliburton each build on Basic. Neither
Basic nor Amgen permit fraud on the market on proof a security’s
price was distorted. Instead, each in its own way presumes investors
rely on security prices reflecting publicly available information. Thus,
loss causation does not do double duty; a separate allegation of
transaction causation—reliance on the market—is required. We can
find in all three decisions the belief that the heart of fraud on the
market is that security prices impound financially significant
information as each decision is focused on evidence that a security’s
price has been impacted by public information. It is on this process
that investors rely. If the plaintiffs make this showing, fraud on the
market is available because the security is believed to be traded in
such a market. Hence, the question: What are the characteristics of
such a market?

86. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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There is an enormous literature examining the broad questions of
whether, to what extent, and under what conditions markets perform
in a manner consistent with the EMH. The early empirical studies—
those that formed not just the bedrock of the EMH, but more
importantly framed the EMH literature relied upon by Basic—
87
logically began with listed, large-cap companies. There are two
significant reasons why the larger issuers became the dominant focus
of the research. First, if an investigator wished to test the hypothesis,
she would intuitively begin by investigating stock prices for large-cap
companies. It is much more intuitive to hypothesize that the stock of
such firms trade in markets that have multiple forces that will move
their prices rapidly to respond to new information; they are deep
markets that therefore attract institutional investors who demand
liquidity. And, where the institutions exist, there is a demand curve for
analysts and research that will guide the institution’s trading. Hence,
they trade in not just an environment that is informationally rich but
also in an environment that attracts a crowd eager to arbitrage new
kernels of information as it becomes available. Second, academics
follow the wise guidance of Dirty Harry: They know their limitations.
The life’s milk of the empiricist is the database. Thus, early EMH
research was guided by firms that were included in such wellrecognized databases as CRSP and Compustat, for which the
researcher could efficiently extract information to examine stock
prices in response to public announcements. Thus, the earliest studies
by Nobel Laureate Eugene Fama had a very limited focus; he
examined only companies among the exclusive club making up the
88
Dow Jones Industrial Average. The next wave of work broadened
the inquiry to include stocks listed on the New York Stock
89
Exchange. These were the studies that shaped the contemporary
87. See generally Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A
Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (1984).
88. Eugene F. Fama & Marshall E. Blume, Filter Rules and Stock-Market Trading, 39 J.
BUS. 226, 228 (Supp. 1966); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS.
34, 45 (1965).
89. See, e.g., William H. Beaver, The Information Content of Annual Earnings
Announcements, 6 J. ACCT. RES. 67, 70 (Supp. 1968) (sampling annual earnings announcements
released by New York Stock Exchange member firms); Peter Lloyd Davies & Michael Canes,
Stock Prices and the Publication of Second-Hand Information, 51 J. BUS. 43, 46 (1978)
(examining stock price responses to “Heard on the Street” column recommendations using a
sample limited to stocks that were “almost all from the NYSE”); Eugene F. Fama et al.,
Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1969) (limiting
analysis of stock splits data to firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange); Michael Firth,
The Information Content of Large Investment Holdings, 30 J. FIN. 1265, 1267 (1975)
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EMH literature. The literature did not reject the EMH for non-listed
or small-cap firms; yet, that group of firms was, and largely continues
to be, ignored. They are also outside the contemporary applications of
fraud on the market. But need this be the case?
There is some research on small-cap firms. Not surprisingly, the
research supports our intuition that the stock prices of these firms are
responsive to material financial information. That is, to the fraudster
behind “pump and dump” schemes that plague the small, nonreporting companies that trade in the “Pink Sheet Market,” a core
feature of his abusive practice is the circulation of unfounded rumors
90
with the intended effect of driving a stock’s price up. Because the
firms are thinly traded, a slight shift in demand has an immediate
impact on the security’s price, allowing the unscrupulous fraudster
who planted the rumor to dump his shares at a substantial profit.
Hence, a study of Pink Sheet traded securities documented that for
such firms trading jumped dramatically in connection with favorable
91
“touting” of the firms. Also, the imposition of reporting
requirements for securities traded on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin
Board that improved the quality of disclosures had a positive effect
92
on the firms’ shares and improved liquidity for investors. Again, this
is a finding consistent with financially significant information
impacting security prices, even in small-cap firms. Professor Kate
Litvak provides an interesting insight, that returns were affected for
securities traded on the Pink Sheet market by the market’s operator
assigning classifications based on disclosure practices of the subject
93
firm. Of particular interest, the assigned designations were based
(investigating the impact of announcements of equity acquisitions with a premium of 10 percent
or larger in “quoted companies”); R. Richardson Petit, Dividend Announcements, Security
Performance, and Capital Market Efficiency, 27 J. FIN. 993, 997 (1972) (analyzing the impact of
dividend announcements on the stock prices of New York Stock Exchange firms). Cf. Ross
Watts, The Information Content of Dividends, 46 J. BUS. 191, 197 (1973) (selecting information
from Standard and Poor's Compustat and Center for Research in Security Prices databases
which identified firms “tend[ing] to be larger and less risky than the average firm”).
90. See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 406–07 (7th ed. 2013) (examining penny stock frauds).
91. Laura Frieder & Jonathan Zittrain, Spam Works: Evidence from Stock Touts and
Corresponding Market Activity 31 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 135), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=920553 (explaining that trading activity increased from 4 percent to 70
percent on a day when touting occured).
92. Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure
Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 233, 257 (2005)
(noting that many firms chose to avoid the reporting requirements, thus migrating to the Pink
Sheet market).
93. Kate Litvak, Summary Disclosure and the Efficiency of the OTC Market: Evidence
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solely on publicly available information, thus suggesting that there
was information content in the market operator’s judgment regarding
the disclosure practices of subject firms. Each of these studies of the
stock prices of small-cap firms challenges the contemporary binary
approach to market efficiency. Each of these studies shows priceinformation correlations consistent with the tenets of Basic and
Amgen, even though they focus on firms that the courts routinely
exclude from fraud on the market.
None of the preceding studies of stock price behavior for smallcap firms would, pursuant to Basic’s formulation, rebut the
presumption of investor reliance:
Any showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the
plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance. For example, . . . if,
despite petitioners’ alleged fraudulent attempt to manipulate
market price, news of the merger discussions credibly entered the
market and dissipated the effects of the misstatements, those who
traded Basic shares after the corrective statements would have no
direct or indirect connection with the fraud. Petitioners also could
rebut the presumption of reliance as to plaintiffs who would have
divested themselves of their Basic shares without relying on the
integrity of the market. For example, a plaintiff who believed that
Basic’s statements were false and that Basic was indeed engaged in
merger discussions, and who consequently believed that Basic
stock was artificially underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless
because of other unrelated concerns, e.g., potential antitrust
problems, or political pressures to divest from shares of certain
businesses, could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a
94
price he knew had been manipulated.

Moreover, the evidence that prices of small-cap firms move in
response to securities prices would appear consistent with the
fundamental criterion that underlies Basic, Halliburton, and now
Amgen’s fundamental premise—that an investor presumptively relies
on a misrepresentation so long as it was reflected in the market price
95
at the time of his transaction. At the same time, passive forms of

from the Pink Sheets Experiment 3, (May 3, 2009) (working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443595.
94. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248–49 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
95. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011).

COX 2.4.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

26

2/15/2014 2:45 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 9

96

investing, described earlier, would appear a basis for removing that
class of investors from fraud on the market claims since price is not a
97
factor in their reliance.
As seen, the EMH does not describe how or why investors act as
they do. Earlier, different types of investment approaches were
98
described. For some of these approaches, and most clearly for the
classic investor, there most certainly is reliance on prices in response
to truthful financial reports. But in today’s market, the image of the
classic investor is at best quaint and even dated. Today, indexing and
algorithmic investing are so commonplace such that the bold image
upon which Basic rests is challenged. It is too easy to dismiss the
indexer and algorithmic investor as not trading on the basis of
reliance on price, but other factors. They each may be seen as little
more than a dart thrower whose aim is driven by a heuristic, albeit
one not premised on price. As such, they would appear to fall within
the above-quoted dicta of Basic regarding grounds for rebutting the
99
presumed reliance.
It is here that the role of presumption comes into the analysis. The
foundation of Basic was not obeisance to the EMH, but rather Justice
Blackmun’s reasoning of the useful role of presumptions and what
considerations justify resort to a presumption:
Presumptions typically serve to assist courts in managing
circumstances in which direct proof, for one reason or another, is
rendered difficult. . . . Arising out of considerations of fairness,
public policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy,
presumptions are also useful devices for allocating the burdens of
proof between parties. . . . The presumption of reliance employed
in this case is consistent with, and, by facilitating Rule 10b-5
litigation, supports, the congressional policy embodied in the 1934
Act. In drafting that Act, Congress expressly relied on the premise
that securities markets are affected by information, and enacted
legislation to facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of
100
those markets.

96. See supra pp. 1–3.
97. Cf. GAMCO Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi S.A., 927 F. Supp. 2d 88, 101–02 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (dismissing the suit because the facts misrepresented did not assume importance in the
professional trader’s investment model).
98. See supra pp. 1–3.
99. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
100. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245–46 (1988).
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Just as the dart thrower places unqualified trust in both the EMH
and the pricing of securities his darts find, an important part of the
indexer’s strategy is the belief that markets are sufficiently
trustworthy so that such passive investment is consistent with the
101
advisor’s fiduciary obligations. An investor’s presumed reliance on
102
market integrity, a point repeatedly emphasized in Basic, is likely
more important to passive investors than active ones. Thus, much of
the source of Basic’s presumption of investor reliance was grounded
in congressional intent. To be sure, the Court further supported its
conclusion by observing that in light of studies of stock prices in welldeveloped markets, “common sense and probability” further
103
supported the presumption. But more emphasis can be placed on
Basic’s over-arching rationale about the role presumptions should
play in resolving disputes.
The Roberts Court utilized presumptions, much like the Court did
in Basic. The Roberts Court repeatedly anchors resort to a
presumption in presumed congressional intent and the quest to
conserve judicial resources. Though the Roberts Court’s framework is
104
similar to Basic’s—congressional intent and judicial economies
105
informed by practical realities —the case outcomes tend to narrow
rather than expand access to the courts. But of overriding importance
in these decisions, as well as Basic, is congressional intent.
Notably, Congress has not directly approved fraud on the market.
However, its extensive reforms in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) clearly recognized not only private
rights of action, but also addressed a concern for causation that could

101. See supra notes 6–7.
102. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47 (“An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set
by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.”).
103. Id. at 246.
104. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (applying the wellestablished canon of statutory construction that laws are presumed not to apply
extraterritorially); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank. Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (same); Ill.
Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (rejecting presumption of market
power linked to patented product for antitrust cases because Congress eliminated the market
power presumption in patent misuse cases); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 135
(2005) (recognizing presumption of fee award in civil rights litigation, but deciding no fee award
was appropriate for successful remand of the case to state court).
105. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 106 (2010) (holding that to conserve judicial
resources, there is a presumption of voluntariness on the part of the defendant who responds to
questioning more than fourteen days after invoking his request for an attorney); Clark v.
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006) (upholding Arizona’s rule barring mental-disease and capacity
evidence short of insanity from offsetting evidence of mens rea).
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only apply in open-market fraud cases such as fraud on the market
cases. For example, the PSLRA established a procedure for selecting a
106
lead plaintiff for any securities class actions and limits any plaintiff’s
recovery by the mean trading price of the security within a ninety-day
107
window of the truthful disclosure. The latter provision addresses the
case where a material decline in a security’s price accompanies
disclosures that the plaintiff alleges were admissions of earlier
fraudulent reporting, but the market, on reflection, significantly
bounces back. The reasoning being: No harm, no foul—or at least one
having a lower impact. Minimally implicit in this provision is
Congress’s belief that markets can overreact but are efficient over
some period of time. Congress’s stated ninety days is somewhat
corrective of such overreaction. The provision is also suggestive that
Congress believes markets are noisy, a fact supported as well by
contemporary EMH research. Congress therefore provided a means
to address one concern for noisy markets: the ninety-day postcorrective disclosure mean trading price as a check on volatility that
otherwise would enhance the plaintiff’s damage claims. Seeing as this
provision also addresses class action procedures, Congress not only
understood that markets could be so volatile, but that the securities
traded in such markets would be subject to class action suits that
necessarily would be premised on fraud on the market. Hence,
volatility and short-term corrections could be expected for securities
subject to fraud on the market suits.
Thus, congressional intent supportive of fraud on the market can
easily be located and that intent remains consistent with Basic’s
invoking a presumption of reliance where appropriate. The Supreme
Court in both Basic and Amgen believed that central to investor
reliance is the process by which public markets imbed financially
108
significant information into stock prices. It is reliance, or rather trust
in this process, that investors rely in ways that the Court believed
106. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(a)(3) (West 2013).
107. Id. § 78u-4(e).
108. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013) (“If
a market is generally efficient in incorporating publicly available information into a security’s
market price, it is reasonable to presume that a particular, public, material misrepresentation
will be reflected in the security’s price.”); Basic, 485 U.S. at 245–46 (“In drafting [the Exchange]
Act, Congress expressly relied on the premise that securities markets are affected by
information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of those
markets.”); id. at 246 (“Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that
the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.” (footnote omitted)).
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satisfied the reliance requirement for fraud on the market. What
appears most consistent with the reasoning in both Basic and Amgen
is evidence supporting the investor’s dependence on the integrity by
which the pricing of shares occurs in the market. Certainly the classic
investor places faith in the information relied on to trade and
presumably this extends to faith that share prices reflect publicly
available information. The indexer and style investor also place faith
in the market’s pricing mechanism. Consider that each type of trader
is most likely an institution whose investment actions are subject to
fiduciary obligations owed to the beneficiaries of the managed funds.
Without trust in the markets in which trades are made, the funds
could hardly be seen to act consistent with these obligations. Clearly,
if faith is to be found in the integrity of the stock pricing process, it
would be among the quintessential indexed fund. Similarly, the
modeler would not be comfortable with reliance on an algorithm if
there was not faith that the trades directed by the equation would be
carried out in a market whose parameters for risk, including the risk
of misinformation, were calculated. And the dart thrower is perhaps
the most trusting of all; the dart thrower has so much belief in the
market to believe it is not worth second-guessing choices that fate
would otherwise command.
CONCLUSION
After Amgen reliance continues to be a requirement for invoking
fraud on the market. Despite some slight clarification of how fraud on
the market is to be applied, the Court has not specified just what form
reliance is to take. As developed here, the muddle was created by
Basic’s invocation of the EMH to support what the EMH does not
address—how investors act in an efficient market. Nor did Basic or
Amgen provide much guidance as to what is an efficient market and
just what “efficient” means under fraud on the market. The
opaqueness is likely due to the serious disconnect between the EMH,
our markets, and most particularly how investors behave.
The path forward from this Court-created conundrum is
straightforward enough. Because reliance is required and reliance was
stated in Basic to be market-centric, the proof of reliance should be
met by allegations that investors believed in the integrity of the stock
pricing function typically provided for that security’s price. This would
turn not on all the Cammer factors but on evidence of how that
security’s price has generally responded to material non-public
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information. As seen earlier, this factor dwarfs the other factors, such
as the number of analysts, the presence of institutional investors, the
109
depth of the market, etc. The real proof here is in observing how the
stock’s price generally responds to information of the type alleged to
have been omitted or misstated. This would represent an expansion of
the availability of fraud on the market. Equally important, evidence
that investors are indexers, modelers, or even the proverbial dart
thrower should not result in automatic disqualification in the face of
understanding that these positions naturally assume reliance, not
distrust, on the integrity of the process by which stock prices are
formed. This approach is consistent with Congress’s embrace of openmarket frauds in enacting the PSLRA. Presumptions are, of course,
rebuttable, as Basic recognized. Basic placed its embrace on a
presumption jointly premised on the expectations of investors
regarding the integrity of securities markets, as well as Congress’s
efforts to preserve their integrity. This presumption should remain an
unchallenged bedrock for fraud on the market as an instrument of
important public policy.

109. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.

